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ARTICLE
Cartoon Controversies at the European 
Court of Human Rights: Towards 
Forensic Humor Studies
Alberto Godioli
European Culture and Literature, Faculty of Arts, University of Groningen, Groningen, NL
a.godioli@rug.nl
How can judges draw a line between innocent jokes and potentially harmful 
ones? Due to its inherent link with ambiguity, humor is an extremely arduous 
testing ground for the legal regulation of freedom of expression—all the 
more so in the case of cartoons and other forms of highly condensed, 
predominantly visual humor. The juridical challenges presented by humorous 
expression are particularly topical in the digital age, as shown by the 
mediatic impact of recent humor scandals from Jyllands-Posten to Charlie 
Hebdo; nevertheless, the potential for interdisciplinary dialogue between 
law and humor studies is still strikingly underexplored. This paper aims 
to contribute to the development of forensic humor studies by analyzing 
a corpus of 10 rulings delivered by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), revolving around controversial examples of predominantly visual 
humor. After identifying the criteria underpinning the selected judgements 
and discussing the problems posed by the current ECtHR approach, the 
present study sets out to illustrate how insights coming from humor studies 
can prove instrumental in tackling those problems. Building on theoretical 
models proposed by Wayne Booth and Paul Simpson, it will be argued that 
a closer dialogue with humor studies can be of particular help to judges 
dealing with three key questions: does the impugned text clearly signal 
its humorous or satirical intent? What is the aim or message hiding behind 
the humorous surface? And to what extent should the author be held 
accountable for different (and potentially dangerous) interpretations of 
the same text?
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1. Introduction
Drawing a line between one’s ‘right to offend’ and someone else’s ‘right not to be 
offended’ is a particularly arduous task when humor is involved. Due to its inherent 
ambiguity and elusiveness, humorous expression can be hard to decipher, and the 
difference between harmful behavior and an ‘innocent joke’ is often far from clear. 
A recent example is comedian Jo Brand’s joke on the milkshake attack against Brexit 
Party leader Nigel Farage in May 2019 (‘Why bother with a milkshake when you 
could get some battery acid?’), which resulted in a police investigation as well as in 
a heated public debate on the boundaries between dark humor and incitement to 
violence; the investigation was eventually dropped, due to the joke being uttered in a 
clearly signaled comedic context (Rawlinson and Siddique, 2019). The challenge is all 
the more evident in the case of predominantly visual humor, as best demonstrated 
through history by the genre of cartoons. Given their condensed format and their high 
degree of implicitness or ‘semiotic density’ (Pedrazzini and Scheuer, 2018), cartoons 
are a particularly vivid example of the link between humor and ambiguity, and of 
the ensuing difficulties in drawing a line between lawful and unlawful expression. 
Not by chance, cartoons have been at the center of several legal debates and actual 
court litigations in recent years. One of the most famous cases is the Muhammad 
cartoon controversy of 2005-2006, namely the first ‘transnational humor scandal’ 
(Kuipers, 2011), caused by the publication of twelve caricatures of Muhammad on 
the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten; on that occasion a trial never took place, but 
representatives of Muslim organizations did file a complaint with the Danish police 
thus leading to an investigation by the public prosecutor (Klausen, 2009). The same 
cartoons were then reprinted by Charlie Hebdo, which led instead to a trial at the 
Paris High Court (the magazine was eventually acquitted in 2007). Later instances 
include the lawsuits concerning Charlie Hebdo’s cartoon on the Amatrice earthquake 
(Griffen, 2016) and the one depicting far-right leader Marine Le Pen as a ‘steaming 
excrement’ (Chrisafis, 2019), as well as the allegedly antisemitic cartoon published by 
Brazilian newspaper O Dia in January 2019 (Harpin, 2019).
The juridical challenges posed by controversial humor are especially urgent 
in the digital age, where extreme speech and the reactions it may trigger are 
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amplified by a growing set of ‘accelerants’ (Scharffs, 2017) including most notably 
the polarizing dynamics of social media. Yet, despite the topicality of the issue, 
there is still a striking gap in academic research on humor and the law. To be sure, 
an impressive amount of valuable scholarly work has been published on the legal 
regulation of freedom of expression, with satire often being discussed together with 
other modes of communication—recent landmark publications in this field, also 
featuring extensive bibliographies, include Kuhn (2019), Koltay and Temperman 
(2017), Garton Ash (2016), O’Reilly (2016), Waldron (2012), and Hare and Weinstein 
(2009). Nevertheless, nearly none of the available studies on the subject actively 
engage with the theoretical and methodological tools provided by humor studies; the 
only exception is represented by a small group of scholars focusing on the American 
context. More precisely, Parks and Heard (2010) combine federal case law with humor 
theory in their analysis of Sean Delonas’ infamous Obama cartoon published by the 
New York Post in February 2009, while Little (2019 and 2011) insightfully discusses 
First Amendment case law in light of incongruity theory and of the General Theory 
of Verbal Humor (Little 2011 also includes a comparative approach to Australian case 
law). Lastly, Todd (2016) draws on notions originating from literary studies (such as 
parody, intertextuality, and the distinction between Horatian and Juvenalian satire) 
to analyze a series of relevant cases. However, as pointed out by both Little and Todd, 
much work remains to be done in this sense; interdisciplinary dialogue between law 
and humor scholars is urgently required in order to provide courts and commentators 
with ‘an adequate terminology that is grounded in theory’, and thereby ‘clarify and 
rationalize the different outcomes’ reached in court (Todd, 2016: 69 and 61).
The present paper aims to mark a further step in the direction of what I propose 
to call forensic humor studies, i.e. the systematic application of insights from humor 
research to the juridical field. Here and throughout the paper, the word ‘humor’ is 
used in its broadest sense, encompassing all kinds of facetious expression—which 
also includes satire, commonly defined as a mode of communication where ridicule 
is used ‘to expose and criticize prevailing immorality or foolishness, esp. as a form 
of social or political commentary’ (Oxford English Dictionary). For the sake of 
feasibility, this pilot study will limit its scope to one specific genre of humorous 
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expression (cartooning, with exceptions from neighboring forms of predominantly 
visual humor), and to the specific context of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The decision to focus on cartoons is due to their particular proneness 
to semiotic density and ambiguity, which makes them an ideal testing ground to 
investigate how humor is handled in court; however, many of the findings presented 
in this paper will hopefully be transferrable to other kinds of humorous texts as 
well (‘text’ is used in this paper in its broad semiotic sense, covering both verbal 
and non-verbal communication). The European Court of Human Rights, instead, 
was chosen because of its ongoing struggles in finding a consistent approach to the 
regulation of freedom of expression. Indeed, the ECtHR ‘has yet to define a single 
direction to be followed in this matter’ (Koltay, 2017: 245); it therefore stands out 
as a particularly compelling case study as well as an exemplary counterpart to the 
United States system, where freedom of expression is notoriously and consistently 
granted a privileged status in light of ‘the exceptional First Amendment’ (Schauer, 
2005). 
The following section will present the corpus of this study; Section 3 will provide 
a systematic overview of the criteria used by the ECtHR in the selected cases, thus 
setting the basis for a discussion of the problems underlying the current ECtHR 
approach (Section 4); Section 5 will demonstrate how relevant notions from humor 
studies can prove instrumental in addressing those problems, while the Conclusion 
will summarize the findings of the paper and outline possible directions for future 
research in the field. Before moving on to Section 2, one last remark is necessary: 
since this article is ideally addressed to both humor and legal scholars, a conscious 
effort was made to clarify all technical expressions from either side. A preliminary 
apology is therefore in order, should the phrasing of some passages be perceived as 
redundant by specialized readers in either discipline.
2. The Corpus
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was established in 1959; it deals with 
individual and State applications claiming violation of one or more rights established 
under the European Convention on Human Rights. The present paper focuses on 
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cases revolving around the limits of freedom of expression, which is regulated by 
Article 10 of the Convention. The article reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This 
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for pre-
venting the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for masng 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Notably, the first paragraph of Article 10 is ordinarily applied ‘not only to “information” 
or “ideas” that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any section 
of the population’, as first stated in Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) and later 
reprised by the ECtHR in most Article 10 cases. Applications under the provision of 
Article 10 are typically presented by individuals or associations claiming that their 
right to freedom of expression was unlawfully interfered with by a ruling delivered 
in one of the contracting states; after the preliminary finding of admissibility, cases 
are tried by a chamber of seven judges or by a 17-member Grand Chamber. The 
outcome of the ECtHR decision may point to a violation of Article 10 on the part of 
the local court (thus protecting the applicant’s freedom of expression), or may back 
the decision made at a national level by not finding a violation of Article 10. The 
final decision may be shared unanimously by the Court, or include separate opinions 
(whether dissenting or concurring) by one or more judges.
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Based on a systematic search through the comprehensive database of the ECtHR 
(HUDOC), it was possible to assemble a corpus of 10 cases regarding cartoons or 
other comparable forms of predominantly visual humor. The decision to focus on 
these examples is primarily due to the fact that cartoons stand out as a particularly 
compact and semantically dense form of communication, and therefore represent 
an ideal testbed for analyzing how judges deal with the ambiguity and elusiveness of 
humor. Since the selected cases will be the object of close comparative inspection in 
the following sections, and considering that the present study is meant for a broad 
interdisciplinary readership, concise lay summaries of each case are provided below: 
– Case of Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria (68354/01, final decision 
25 April 2007): Between April and June 1998, the applicant (an association 
of artists called Vereinigung Bildender Künstler Wiener Secession) held an 
exhibition including the satirical painting ‘Apocalypse’ by Austrian painter 
Otto Mühl. The painting featured photomontages showing members of the 
conservative right-wing Austrian Freedom Party (as well as religious figures 
such as Mother Teresa and Austrian cardinal Hermann Groer) engaging in 
graphic sexual acts. One of the politicians portrayed in the painting, namely 
former Freedom Party secretary Walter Meischberger, filed a lawsuit against 
the association. Outcome at a national level: The artists were fined, and per-
manently banned from displaying the painting. ECtHR decision: Violation 
of Article 10 (four votes to three). (NB: ‘Violation of Article 10’ means that 
the ECtHR ruled in favor of the applicant’s freedom of expression; ‘No viola-
tion’ means that it ruled against the applicant’s freedom of expression, thus 
backing the previous decision taken at a national level.)
– Case of Kuliś and Różycki v. Poland (27209/03, final decision 6 January 
2010): On 16 May 2009, children’s magazine Angorka (represented by 
the applicants) published a cartoon satirizing the advertising campaign 
launched by food company Star Foods to promote its potato chips. The 
Star Foods campaign was based on a series of images that were deemed 
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inappropriate for a product that was mostly meant for children, including 
one advertisement accusing Reksio (a popular cartoon character for Polish 
children) of being a murderer. Angorka’s cartoon showed a boy holding 
a packet of Star Foods potato chips, and saying to Reksio: ‘Don’t worry! I 
would be a murderer too if I ate this muck!’ The heading above the cartoon 
read ‘Polish children shocked by crisps advertisement, “Reksio is a murder-
er”’. Outcome at a national level: The applicants were convicted of defama-
tion. ECtHR decision: Violation of Article 10 (unanimous).
– Affaire Leroy c. France (36109/03, final decision 6 April 2009): On 13 
 September 2001, Basque magazine Ekaitza published a satirical cartoon by 
the applicant ostensibly celebrating the 9/11 attacks. The cartoon showed 
two planes crashing into the Twin Towers, accompanied by the caption ‘We 
all dreamed of it… Hamas did it’ (echoing the slogan of a Sony advertising 
campaign). Outcome at a national level: The applicant was convicted of apol-
ogy of terrorism. ECtHR decision: No violation of Article 10 (unanimous).
– Affaire Société de Conception de Presse et d’Édition et Ponson c. France 
(26935/05, final decision 5 June 2009): In June 2002, the widely read maga-
zine Entrevue (represented by the applicant) published an article on the most 
paid athletes in the world, featuring a photograph of Michael Schumacher 
sporting the logo of a cigarette brand and highlighting that much of his in-
come originated from his sponsor. The magazine also featured a satirical pho-
tomontage showing two packets of cigarettes of the same brand engaging in 
anal sex, accompanied by the caption ‘Warning: Smoking… gives you anal 
cancer’. Both the photograph and the photomontages were impugned for il-
legal advertising, and were discussed in separate paragraphs in the ECtHR de-
cision. Due to its humorous component, only the photomontage is relevant 
for our analysis. Outcome at a national level: The applicant was convicted of 
illegal advertising. ECtHR decision: No violation of Article 10 (unanimous).
– Case of Aguilera Jimenez and Others v. Spain (28389/06, 28955/06, 
28957/06, 28959/06, 28961/06 and 28964/06, referred to the Grand 
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Chamber on 10 May 2010): The applicants were employed as delivery men 
by the company P., against which they had filed a series of proceedings 
in employment tribunals. In 2001 they set up the trade union N.A.A. to 
defend the interests of the delivery staff. In April 2002, the trade union 
bulletin published a cartoon depicting two employees of the company 
waiting in line to perform oral sex to the company’s human resources 
manager; the two employees portrayed in the cartoon had testified 
against the trade union in the proceedings mentioned above. Upon be-
ing fired by the company as a result of the publication of the cartoon, 
the applicants challenged the company’s decision in court and evoked 
their right to freedom of expression. Outcome at a national level: The ap-
plicants’ claim was dismissed. ECtHR decision: No violation of Article 10 
(six votes to one).
– Case of Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain (28955/06, 28957/06, 
28959/06 and 28964/06, final decision 12 September 2011): This is the 
Grand Chamber continuation of Aguilera Jimenez and Others, confirming 
the previous verdict. ECtHR decision: No violation of Article 10 (twelve votes 
to five).
– Affaire Féret c. Belgique (15615/07, final decision 10 December 2009): 
Between 1999 and 2001, the right-wing populist party Front National 
(represented by the applicant) published a series of xenophobic cartoons 
and leaflets online and in print. One of the cartoons explicitly attributed 
the 9/11 attacks to the ‘couscous clan’, establishing a direct link between 
 Islam and terrorism. Outcome at a national level: The applicant was con-
victed of incitement to hatred. ECtHR decision: No violation of Article 10 
(four votes to three).
– Case of Bohlen v. Germany (53495/09, final decision 19 May 2015): The ap-
plicant, German musician Dieter Bohlen, had published an autobiography 
titled Backstage in 2003; the book had to be heavily redacted because of 
a series of defamation proceedings which had been brought against the 
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author. In October 2003, British American Tobacco GmbH launched a 
visual advertisement for Lucky Strike in Germany featuring two packets of 
cigarettes, a black marker, and the ostensibly redacted slogan ‘Look, dear 
Dieter, how easy it is to write super books’. Bohlen sued Lucky Strike for the 
allegedly unlawful and derogatory use of his forename, under the provi-
sion of Article 8 of the Convention (protecting personality rights); the com-
pany’s right to advertise its product, instead, was discussed by the ECtHR 
in the framework of Article 10. Outcome at a national level: The applicant’s 
claim was dismissed. ECtHR decision: No violation of Article 8 (six votes to 
one); the company’s freedom of expression is therefore protected.
– Case of Ernst August von Hannover v. Germany (application no. 53649/09, 
final decision 19 May 2015): The case is formally identical to Dieter Bohlen. 
In 2000, a Lucky Strike visual advertisement was launched showing a crum-
pled pack of cigarettes accompanied by the slogan ‘Was it Ernst? Or was 
it August?’ The slogan alluded to Prince Ernst August of Hannover, who 
was involved in a series of scuffles and altercations between 1998 and 
2000, thereby gaining a reputation as a violent and irascible person. Von 
Hannover sued British American Tobacco under the provision of Article 8; 
the company’s right to advertise the product was discussed by ECtHR in the 
framework of Article 10. Outcome at a national level: The applicant’s claim 
was dismissed. ECtHR decision: No violation of Article 8 (six votes to one); 
the company’s freedom of expression is therefore protected.
– Case of Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania (69317/14, final decision 30 April 
2018): In September and October 2012, the applicant company ran an ad-
vertising campaign for a clothing collection. The ads featured photographs 
of models whose looks hinted at Jesus and Mary, accompanied by the slo-
gans ‘Jesus, what trousers!’, ‘Dear Mary, what a dress!’, ‘Jesus [and] Mary, 
what are you wearing!’ Outcome at a national level: The applicant company 
was convicted of ‘violating public morals’. ECtHR decision: Violation of Arti-
cle 10 (unanimous, with one concurring opinion).
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3. Identifying the Criteria
For each of the cases outlined above, the sections containing the arguments and 
decisions of ECtHR judges (Law, Judgement, and Dissenting or Concurring Opinions) 
were analyzed in order to tease out the criteria underlying the Court’s reasoning. 
On a general level, the selected cases—as is customary with Article 10 case law—
adopt a three-part test for assessing restrictions on freedom of expression, which is 
articulated as follows: 1) the restriction must be prescribed by law; 2) the restriction 
must protect one of the interests listed in the second paragraph of Article 10; 3) the 
restriction must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. In relevant cases, the three-part test can be combined with 
the ‘abuse clause’ of Article 17, whereby freedom of expression should not imply any 
right to engage in the ‘destruction’ or ‘limitation’ of any of the rights and freedoms 
set forth in the Convention. Article 17 has been used by the ECtHR either as an 
interpretative aid within the three-part test, or as a ‘guillotine’ allowing for the 
categorical exclusion of certain forms of expression from the protection granted by 
Article 10;1 within our corpus, however, Article 17 is only mentioned in one case 
(Féret), and its applicability is unanimously rejected by the Court.
In most Article 10 jurisprudence (including our corpus cases), the crucial element 
of the test is its last step, i.e. the ‘necessity test’. In order to determine whether 
restricting a certain form of expression is necessary in a democratic society, the Court 
may assess the application based on a variety of criteria, depending on the specific 
circumstances of the case. As far as our corpus is concerned, the following 10 criteria 
could be identified:
1. Humorous or satirical intent: The humorous or satirical intention of the text is 
marked by clear indicators, which allows for a higher degree of protection v. the text’s 
intention is not clearly indicated, and therefore there are no excuses for its violent 
and offensive tone. This criterion is used in all 10 cases. The first two examples refer 
to the first scenario (clear satirical intent), while the last two refer to the latter:
 1 With regard to the interaction between Articles 10 and 17 in ECtHR case law, see in particular Lobba, 
2017; Cannie and Voorhoof, 2011; and Keane, 2007.
Godioli: Cartoon Controversies at the European Court of Human Rights 11 
•	 ‘It was common ground in the understanding of the domestic courts at all 
levels that the painting obviously did not aim to reflect or even to suggest 
reality … The Court finds that such portrayal amounted to a caricature of the 
persons concerned using satirical elements. It notes that satire is a form of 
artistic expression and social commentary and, by its inherent features of 
exaggeration and distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate. 
Accordingly, any interference with an artist’s right to such expression must 
be examined with particular care.’ (Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, §33)
•	 ‘As regards the cartoon on the newsletter’s cover, it is a caricature, which, 
while being vulgar and tasteless in nature, should be taken for what it is – a 
satirical representation. In other cases, the Court has recognised the satirical 
nature of an expression, publication or caricature.’ (Palomo Sanchez, Dissent-
ing Opinion, §11)
•	 ‘An image will not become ‘satirical’ if the observer does not comprehend 
or detect any message in the form of a meaningful attack or criticism relat-
ing to a particular problem or a person’s conduct … [The painting] showed a 
number of unrelated personalities (some political, some religious) in a vulgar 
and grotesque presentation and context of senseless, disgusting images of 
erect and ejaculating penises and of naked figures adopting repulsive sexual 
poses, some even involving violence, with coloured and disproportionately 
large genitals or breasts.’ (Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Dissenting Opin-
ion of Judge Loucaides) 
•	 ‘Les intentions du requérant … n’ont d’ailleurs été exprimées que postérieure-
ment et n’étaient pas de nature, au vu du contexte, à effacer l’appréciation 
positive des effets d’un acte criminel.’ [The applicant’s intentions (i.e. 
satirizing US consumerism by echoing the Sony slogan) were only expressed 
ex post; and given the context, they were not enough to erase the positive 
assessment of a criminal act.] (Leroy, §43)
Detecting (or failing to detect) a humorous intent may orientate the Court’s 
assessment of whether the text constitutes a ‘defamatory statement of fact’ or merely 
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a ‘value judgement’ (Kuliś and Różycki, §38); moreover, it often sets the basis for 
determining the aims of the text (gratuitous offense v. public interest, cf. criterion 8) 
and its possible effects (damage to dignity or threat to public peace, criteria 9–10).
2. Explicitness of the message: The potentially offensive message can only be 
deciphered by a relatively small audience (extenuating factor) v. the potentially 
offensive message is delivered in an explicit, assertive way (aggravating factor). 
Occurrences in the corpus: 7 cases.2 The first two examples illustrate the former 
scenario, while the last one refers to the latter:
•	 ‘Only a limited number of people would have been able to make the con-
nection between the advertisement and the applicant, namely those who 
had heard about the applicant’s scuffles, especially as the latter were not 
mentioned in the advertisement but were hinted at in a clever way.’ (Ernst 
August von Hannover, §54)
•	 ‘Even before Mr Meischberger instituted proceedings, the part of the paint-
ing showing him had been damaged so notably that the offensive painting 
of his body was completely covered by red paint. The Court considers that, 
at the very latest from this incident onwards, Mr Meischberger’s portrayal – 
even assuming that he was still recognisable … – was certainly diminished, if 
not totally eclipsed.’ (Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, §36)
•	 ‘The implication of the advertisement is clear enough. It insinuates that Mr 
Bohlen would not have committed the alleged mistakes in his writing if 
only he smoked Lucky Strike cigarettes. The lit cigarette on top of the ciga-
rette box is a clear recommendation to this effect. The message is not even 
subliminal; it is assertive and suggestive.’ (Dieter Bohlen, Dissenting Opinion)
3. Context: The geographical, social or historical context of publication serves as a 
mitigating circumstance v. it serves as an aggravating circumstance. Occurrences in 
 2 The criterion was used in the following cases: Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Conception de Presse et 
d’Édition, Aguilera Jimenez, Palomo Sánchez, Féret, Dieter Bohlen, Ernst August von Hannover.
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the corpus: 6 cases.3 The first two examples below cover the first scenario, while the 
third one refers to the latter:
•	 ‘The scene in which Mr Meischberger was portrayed could be understood to 
constitute some sort of counter-attack against the Austrian Freedom Party, 
whose members had strongly criticised the painter’s work.’ (Vereinigung 
Bildender Künstler, §34)
•	 ‘Est-il équitable d›attribuer un sens islamophobe qui serait apparu en 
septembre 2001 (la caricature du ‘couscous clan’) à des textes distribués en 
1999?’ [Is it fair to attribute an Islamophobic sense that would only appear 
in September 2001 (the ‘couscous clan’ caricature) to texts that were distrib-
uted in 1999?] (Féret, Dissenting Opinion) 
•	 ‘La caricature a pris une ampleur particulière dans les circonstances de 
l’espèce, que le requérant ne pouvait ignorer. Le jour des attentats, soit le 11 
septembre 2001, il déposa son dessin et celui-ci fut publié le 13 septembre, 
alors que le monde entier était sous le choc de la nouvelle, sans que des 
précautions de langage ne soient prises de sa part. … De plus, l’impact d’un 
tel message dans une région politiquement sensible n’est pas à négliger.’ 
[The caricature took on a particular significance in the circumstances of the 
case, which the applicant could not ignore. On the day of the attacks, i.e. 
11th September 2001, he submitted his cartoon which was published on 13th 
September, when the world was still in shock, without any linguistic precau-
tion. Moreover, the impact of such a message in a politically sensitive region 
(= the Basque Country) is not to be overlooked.] (Leroy, §45)
4. Intertextuality: The meaning of the text is clarified (in an extenuating or aggravating 
sense) by means of intertextuality, i.e. by highlighting the relation to a previous 
text or common expression that the impugned work is echoing or reacting against 
 3 Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Kuliś and Różycki, Leroy, Aguilera Jimenez, Palomo Sánchez, Féret, 
Sekmadienis Ltd.
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(the notion of intertextuality is used here in the sense defined by Genette, 1997). 
Occurrences in the corpus: 3 cases.4 Examples:
•	 ‘The wording employed by the applicants had been exaggerated; however, 
they were reacting to slogans used in the plaintiff’s advertising campaign 
which also displayed a lack of sensitivity … The Court thus considers that 
the style of the applicants’ expression was motivated by the type of slogans 
to which they were reacting and, taking into account its context, did not 
overstep the boundaries permissible to a free press.’ (Kuliś and Różycki, §38)
•	 ‘The names of Jesus and Mary in the advertisements had been used not as re-
ligious references but as emotional interjections common in spoken Lithu-
anian, thereby creating a comic effect.’ (Sekmadienis Ltd., §79)
5. Lucid deliberation: The offensive message was uttered in the heat of the moment 
v. it was meant for publication online or in print, and is therefore the result of lucid 
deliberation. Occurrences in the corpus: 2 cases.5 Example: ‘The remarks did not 
constitute an instantaneous and ill-considered reaction, in the context of a rapid and 
spontaneous oral exchange, as is the case with verbal exaggeration. On the contrary, 
they were written assertions, published in a quite lucid manner and displayed 
publicly on the premises of the company P.’ (Palomo Sanchez, §73).
6. Reasonable avoidability: The text was only visible to relatively small groups 
of people who deliberately chose to be exposed to it (i.e. the text passes the 
‘reasonable avoidability’ test, as defined in Feinberg, 1988: 32–33) v. the text was 
publicly displayed, and its view might have been imposed on an unaware audience. 
Occurrences in the corpus: 3 cases.6 Examples:
•	 ‘Les sites web se distinguent d’autres formes de distribution parce … les inté-
ressés doivent rechercher eux-mêmes activement l’information. Autrement 
 4 Kuliś and Różycki, Leroy, Sekmadienis Ltd.
 5 Aguilera Jimenez, Palomo Sánchez.
 6 Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Dieter Bohlen, Ernst August von Hannover. 
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dit, les opinions ne sont pas ‘imposées’. [Websites differ from other forms 
of distribution because those who are interested have to actively look for 
the content. In other words, opinions are not ‘imposed’.] (Féret, Dissenting 
Opinion) 
•	 ‘It might be useful to add that the large-sized painting in question was ex-
hibited in an art gallery open to the general public so that even children 
could find themselves viewing it.’ (Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Dissent-
ing Opinion of Judge Loucaides) 
•	 ‘[The cartoon was] displayed publicly on the premises of the company P.’ 
(Palomo Sanchez, §73)
7. Target: The text targets a public figure, which calls for a wider tolerance of criticism 
v. the text targets private individuals. Occurrences in the corpus: 5 cases.7 Examples:
•	 ‘The painting could hardly be understood to address details of Mr 
 Meischberger’s private life, but rather related to Mr Meischberger’s public 
standing as a politician from the FPÖ. The Court notes that in this capacity 
Mr  Meischberger has to display a wider tolerance in respect of criticism.’ 
(Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, §34)
•	 ‘The applicant belonged to the group of public figures who cannot claim 
protection of their right to respect for their private life in the same way 
as private individuals unknown to the public.’ (Ernst August von Hannover, 
§50)
•	 ‘[The cartoon is aimed] not directly against the company but against the two 
non-salaried delivery men and the human resources manager. The Court re-
iterates in this connection that the extent of acceptable criticism is narrower 
as regards private individuals than as regards politicians or civil servants.’ 
(Palomo Sanchez, §71)
 7 Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Aguilera Jimenez, Palomo Sánchez, Dieter Bohlen, Ernst August von 
Hannover.
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8. Public interest: The text contributes to a public debate, or expresses an opinion on 
a subject of public interest v. the text is gratuitously offensive. This criterion is used in 
all 10 cases. The first three examples below refer to the former scenario (contribution 
to public debate), while the last two refer to the latter (gratuitous offense):
•	 ‘The Court considers that the domestic courts did not give sufficient atten-
tion to the applicants’ argument that the satirical cartoon had been a riposte 
to, in the applicants’ view, an unacceptable advertising campaign conducted 
by Star Foods and targeted at young children. The campaign used slogans 
referring not only to the Reksio character, but also to sexual and cultural be-
haviour, in a manner scarcely appropriate for children – the intended mar-
ket segment. This clearly raises issues which are of interest and importance 
for the public.’ (Kuliś and Różycki, §37) 
•	 ‘L’arrêt admet que les propos de M. Féret relèvent du ‘discours politique’.’ 
[The judgement acknowledges that Mr Féret’s statements pertained to po-
litical discourse.] (Féret, Dissenting Opinion)
•	 ‘As regards the existence of a debate of general interest, the Court notes 
that the German courts found that the impugned advertisement concerned 
a subject of public interest in so far as it referred humorously to the case 
of the applicant’s publication of a book, shortly after the event and in the 
context of the ensuing media debate on the subject.’ (Dieter Bohlen, §50)
•	 ‘The images depicted in this product of what is, to say the least, a strange 
imagination, convey no message; the “painting” is just a senseless, disgust-
ing combination of lewd images whose only effect is to debase, insult and 
ridicule each and every person portrayed.’ (Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides) 
•	 ‘The cartoon and some of the allegations contained in the articles from 
the offending bulletin constituted, by their gravity and tone, attacks of a 
personal, offensive, excessive and gratuitous nature that were certainly not 
necessary for the legitimate defense of the applicants’ interests.’ (Aguilera 
Jimenez, §34).
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9. Damage to dignity: The text can significantly damage the dignity or reputation of 
(groups of) individuals v. the text is not likely to bring significant damage. Occurrences 
in the corpus: 8 cases.8 Examples:
•	 ‘The cartoon and the two impugned articles in the bulletin published and 
displayed by the applicants on the company’s premises had been offensive 
and likely to harm the reputation of others.’ (Aguilera Jimenez, §30) 
•	 ‘To maintain that Mr von Hannover deserved the ‘particularly clever’ (pfiffig) 
negative publicity on account of his bellicose character … and simultane-
ously that because this was “only” a cigarette advertisement, it was not in-
jurious to his personality rights, is going too far.’ (Ernst August von Hannover, 
Dissenting Opinion)
10. Threat to public peace or health: the text constitutes a threat to public peace or 
health v. the text is not likely to constitute a threat. Occurrences in the corpus: 4 
cases.9 Examples:
•	 ‘Un tel discours est inévitablement de nature à susciter parmi le public … 
des sentiments de mépris, de rejet, voire, pour certains, de haine à l’égard 
des étrangers.’ [Such a discourse is inevitably bound to create in the public 
sentiments of contempt, rejection, and hate towards foreigners.] (Féret, §73)
•	 ‘Having viewed the advertisements for itself, the Court considers that at the 
outset they do not … incite hatred on the grounds of religious belief or attack 
a religion in an unwarranted or abusive manner.’ (Sekmadienis Ltd., §77)
It should be noted that only criterion 1 (humorous or satirical intention) is specifically 
related to humor and satire; the others also apply to non-humorous expression, and 
are in fact ordinarily used in Article 10 case law. However, many of these criteria are 
undoubtedly perturbed by the presence of irony, parody, facetious exaggeration and 
 8 Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Kuliś and Różycki, Leroy, Aguilera Jimenez, Palomo Sánchez, Féret, 
Dieter Bohlen, Ernst August von Hannover.
 9 Leroy, Conception de Presse et d’Édition, Féret, Sekmadienis Ltd.
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other humorous techniques. This is especially the case with the criteria that rely 
most closely on the direct interpretation of the text, with a view to reconstructing 
its meaning and intention: humor can make it particularly difficult to determine the 
intent and explicitness of the message (criteria 1-2), to decide whether the text is 
gratuitously offensive or addresses issues of public interest (criterion 8), and to draw 
a line between a joke and a direct threat to human dignity or public peace (9–10). 
In short, the specificity of humor-related cases in Article 10 jurisprudence does not 
lie in the choice of the criteria used for the necessity test (which tend to be same as 
in non-humor-related cases), but rather in how humor complicates the handling of 
many of these criteria. The specific challenges posed by the forensic assessment of 
humor will be further discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
4. Humor as a Challenge
The particularly problematic nature of humor-related cases is confirmed by the simple 
observation that, out of the 10 rulings under examination, seven feature separate 
opinions by one or more judges (six dissenting and one concurring); and although 
the corpus is not statistically representative in the broader context of Article 10 
rulings, this quantitative finding is remarkable in itself, as it suggests a significantly 
higher frequency of separate opinions in humor-related cases compared to the 
ECtHR average of 53% (Franck, 2019; an advanced search via the HUDOC database in 
January 2020 yielded a similar result, with 2317 separate opinions out of 4129 cases). 
A close comparison between majority rulings and separate (especially dissenting) 
opinions highlights the centrality of criteria 1,2, 8, 9 and 10 from the list above—in 
other words, disagreements between majority and minority opinions usually revolve 
around the criteria that are most closely related to the direct interpretation of the 
text, namely the presence of a clear humorous intent and the reconstruction of the 
general aim or specific message of the impugned text. For example, with regard to 
criterion 1, the majority in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler states that Mühl’s painting 
‘obviously’ had a satirical intent (§33), while Judge Loucaides objects that ‘in [his] 
view, the picture in question cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be called 
satirical’ (Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides). 
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Similarly, the dissenting opinion in Palomo Sánchez argues that the majority did not 
pay sufficient attention to the evident humor indicators offered by the text: ‘[The 
cartoon] is a caricature, which, while being vulgar and tasteless in nature, should 
be taken for what it is – a satirical representation. In other cases, the Court has 
recognised the satirical nature of an expression, publication or caricature’ (§11).
But even when judges do concur in recognizing humor markers, they might 
disagree when it comes to reconstructing the message hiding behind the humorous 
surface—a task which is essential to the implementation of criteria 8 (gratuitous 
offence v. public interest), 9 (damage to dignity) and 10 (threat to public peace). 
Ernst August von Hannover and Dieter Bohlen are a fine case in point: the majority 
claims that the Lucky Strike ads ‘had been devoid of any offensive or degrading 
content in relation to the applicant [and] had not been disparaging’, but rather 
‘concerned a subject of public interest’ in so far as they referred to the applicants’ 
widely known public image (Hannover, §53 and Bohlen, §54); the dissenting 
judges, instead, maintain that both texts are clearly ‘mocking’ the applicants in 
a gratuitous way which is not justified by the aim of selling cigarettes (Hannover 
and Bohlen, Dissenting Opinions). In both cases, the interpretive disagreement also 
concerns the degree of explicitness of the message (criterion 2), with the dissenting 
opinions pointing out that the ads’ message ‘is not even subliminal; it is assertive 
and suggestive’, as opposed to the majority statement that the applicants’ deeds 
‘were not mentioned in the advertisement’ but were only ‘hinted at in a clever way’ 
(Ernst August von Hannover, §54). The handling of criterion 8 is also an object of 
contention in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, where the majority considers the 
painting as a piece of ‘social commentary’, while the dissenting opinion writes it off 
as gratuitous provocation: ‘the images depicted in this product of what is, to say the 
least, a strange imagination, convey no message; the “painting” is just a senseless, 
disgusting combination of lewd images whose only effect is to debase, insult and 
ridicule each and every person portrayed’ (Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Loucaides). 
On a side note, it might be useful to remark that the distinction between 
‘gratuitously offensive’ texts and contributions to ‘public debate’ (criterion 8) is 
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widely criticized in recent scholarship. In particular, the very notion of ‘offense’ is 
highly problematic from a juridical standpoint, as it refers to the subjective emotional 
impact of a given text rather than to the objective damage created by said text. An 
effective solution to this problem was put forward by Philippe Yves Kuhn in an article 
on religious and racial hate speech (Kuhn, 2019), which follows Jeremy Waldron’s 
dignitarian approach in distinguishing harm from offense—the former is defined 
as ‘undermining a person’s dignity’ (i.e. ‘objective or social aspects of a person’s 
standing in society’), while the latter refers to ‘subjective aspects of feeling, including 
hurt, shock, and anger’ (Waldron cited in Kuhn, 2019: 129). It follows that harm is 
a better guide than offense when it comes to regulating freedom of expression, as 
it obviates the subjective pitfalls of the ‘gratuitously offensive’ test. Kuhn therefore 
proposes to discard offense as a relevant criterion and to only focus on the relatively 
more objective notion of ‘harm’, which he defines in terms of ‘seriously undermining 
the target’s assurance as to a status of equal worth in the community, having regard 
to the target’s knowledge, the speaker’s power and the forum of the expression, at 
the time it is made’ (2019: 120). Kuhn’s argument is compelling; and indeed, several 
cases in the corpus acknowledge the protection of human dignity and public peace 
as the fundamental reasons to restrict freedom of expression (cf. criteria 9 and 10). 
However, it should be stressed that the higher degree of objectivity inherent to 
the notion of harm is far from eliminating all traces of subjective interpretation, 
as implied by Kuhn when he points out that in order for the harm test to work, ‘it 
is important to recognise the subtextual meanings that hostile messages, signs or 
slurs can convey to their targets’ (2019: 128). The detection and interpretation of 
subtextual meanings is obviously bound to retain a certain degree of subjectivity, 
especially when dealing with humor and satire. This subjective component is 
abundantly illustrated in our corpus, as the conflict between majority and dissenting 
opinions often revolves around whether the text is harmful to the dignity of the 
target (Vereinigung Bildender Künstler, Aguilera Jimenez, Palomo Sánchez, Dieter 
Bohlen and Ernst August von Hannover), or more generally to public peace (Féret). 
Lastly, provided that judges do agree on one interpretation of the text, one 
last interpretive issue may arise: to what extent should the ruling also account for 
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different interpretations? Where does the author’s responsibility end, if the text 
might be (mis)interpreted in a dangerous, offensive or harmful way by some groups 
of readers? According to Kuhn, the harmful potential of a given expression should 
be ‘adjudged from the perspective of a reasonable member of the target group’ 
(2019: 120, my emphasis)—but reasonability is an extremely slippery and culturally 
determined concept, which leaves considerable leeway for interpretation (Moran, 
2007). This issue is particularly relevant in Féret, where the majority decision takes 
into account the potential effect of the impugned texts on an ill-equipped or irrational 
audience: ‘Un tel discours est inévitablement de nature à susciter parmi le public, et 
particulièrement parmi le public le moins averti, des sentiments de mépris, de rejet, 
voire, pour certains, de haine à l’égard des étrangers’ [such a discourse is inevitably 
bound to create in the public, especially among the lesser-equipped, sentiments of 
contempt, rejection, and hate towards foreigners] (Féret, §73; my emphasis). Such an 
approach is heavily criticized in the dissenting opinion by Judges Sajó, Zagrebelsky 
and Tsotsoria, which reads as follows: ‘L’arrêt … juge des êtres humains et toute une 
couche sociale de “nigauds” incapables de répondre aux arguments et aux contre-
arguments en raison de la pulsion irrésistible de leurs émotions irrationnelles’ 
[the judgement considers some human beings and a whole sector of society as 
‘simpletons’ incapable of responding to arguments and counterarguments due to 
the irresistible pulsion of their irrational emotions]. In the dissenting judges’ view, 
the court should therefore only focus on how the text under examination might be 
interpreted by reasonable readers (however ‘reasonability’ is defined), rather than 
holding the author accountable for possible unreasonable interpretations.
In short, a cross-analysis of majority and minority opinions reveals major 
interpretive tensions on three levels: does the text clearly signal its humorous or 
satirical intent? What is the aim or message hiding behind the humorous surface? And 
to what extent should alternative interpretations (by a reasonable or unreasonable 
audience) be accounted for? To be sure, the recurrence of such questions in the 
corpus is not surprising or problematic as such; nevertheless, these hermeneutic 
conflicts are visibly multiplied and exacerbated by the lack of a shared vocabulary 
and a clear theoretical framework allowing judges to deal with humorous texts in 
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a systematic and consistent way. Notably, however, these three questions can set 
the basis for streamlining the treatment of humor in Article 10 cases: while being 
compatible with the criteria presented in Section 3, they can provide judges with 
an efficient blueprint for the application of said criteria. As detailed in the following 
section, insights from humor studies can provide substantial help in this respect.
5. Towards Forensic Humor Studies
The present section will discuss how forensic humor studies can set the basis for a 
consistent treatment of the three questions outlined above: 1) does the text clearly 
signal its humorous or satirical intent? 2) What is the aim or message hiding behind the 
humorous surface? 3) To what extent should alternative interpretations (by a reasonable 
or unreasonable audience) be accounted for? Starting with Question 1, a substantial 
contribution can be derived from two studies focusing on how humor is processed 
by readers—namely Wayne Booth’s A Rhetoric of Irony (1974) and Paul Simpson’s On 
the Discourse of Satire (2003). Although both books only focus on specific humorous 
devices (irony, i.e. meaning something different from what is stated at surface level) 
or modes (satire), certain aspects of their respective models are highly transposable, 
and can pave the way for a forensic analysis of humor. With regard to humor 
indicators, a useful starting point is provided by Booth’s distinction between ‘overt’ 
and ‘covert’ irony: the former is characterized by direct assertions announcing the 
ironic intent (e.g. ‘It is ironic that…’), while the latter is intended to be reconstructed 
through the ‘secret work’ of the reader (Booth, 1974: 234). Despite referring to irony 
specifically, these labels can easily be transferred to humor at large: direct statements 
are indeed the first and most obvious indicator that a given expression is not meant 
to be taken seriously. While such cases are relatively rare, overt markers can still 
have juridical relevance, as was the case with the ‘battery acid’ joke mentioned in 
the Introduction: the fact that Jo Brand overtly indicated her humorous intention 
right after uttering the joke (‘I’m not going to do it, it’s purely a fantasy, but I think 
milkshakes are pathetic, I’m sorry’) played a key role in Scotland Yard’s decision to 
drop the investigation into the comedian (Rawlinson and Siddique, 2019). That being 
said, it is quite uncommon for humor to come with such an explicit label on it; it 
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is therefore essential to develop a shared procedure for detecting and interpreting 
more ‘covert’ humor markers. In this respect, further inspiration comes from Booth’s 
four-step procedure for reconstructing irony in literary fiction, which is reproduced 
below in the concise summary provided by Liesbeth Korthals Altes:
(1)  A reader rejects the surface meaning of an utterance, because she or he 
feels there is an incongruity “between the words and something else he 
knows” (10), especially between the beliefs she or he holds and those 
she or he thinks the author holds (73). This is where irony signals—
incongruities or illogicalities, for instance—play their part.
(2)  The reader then tries out alternatives, which come “flooding in” (11). 
These first two steps by themselves, however, cannot tell us that a 
statement is ironic; that requires
(3)  The (re-)construction of the beliefs and intentions of the utterance’s 
ultimate source—in the case of literature, the implied author (11).
(4)  Finally, the reader constructs a meaning in harmony with those 
hypotheses (10–12). 
(Korthals Altes, 2014: 125; my emphasis)
‘Incongruities’ and ‘illogicalities’ are not only ‘irony signals’—they can serve, more 
generally, as covert (but nevertheless clear) indicators of any kind of humorous 
strategy. Also from a legal perspective, incongruity can effectively serve as a ‘testing 
rod’ for determining ‘whether a communication can be characterized as humorous’ 
(Little, 2011: 157). Humorous incongruity may present itself in several different 
forms, including among others non-sequiturs, anachronisms (Mary and Jesus wearing 
modern clothes and sporting tattoos in Sekmadienis Ltd.), exaggeration (the hyperbolic 
sexual scenes debated in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler or Palomo Sánchez), and the 
parodic echoing of previous texts or images (such as the Star Foods campaign in 
Kuliś and Różycki or the Sony slogan in Leroy). Parody, in turn, can be announced by 
a broad range of indicators, from the exaggeration of certain perceived traits (with 
its aggressive language, the Kuliś and Różycki cartoon reproduces and doubles up 
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on the inappropriateness of the Star Foods campaign) to jarring decontextualization 
(the Leroy cartoon uses the Sony slogan in an entirely different context); a more fine-
grained exploration of parodic mechanisms can be found in Genette (1997).
A valuable contribution towards a systematic classification of humorous 
incongruities is offered by Simpson’s analysis of satirical discourse, which too can be 
fruitfully extended to humor at large. In particular, Simpson distinguishes between 
‘metonymic’ and ‘metaphoric’ mechanisms, respectively taking place within the same 
conceptual domain (as is the case with metonymy) or bridging different domains 
as metaphors do (2003: 125–149). The former category encompasses the following 
processes: 1) Saturation, such as caricature and other forms of exaggeration (e.g. 
the hyperbolic sexual content of Vereinigung Bildender Künstler); 2) Attenuation or 
‘undercoding’, i.e. subtle allusion achieved by way of withholding information (e.g. the 
Lucky Strike ad hinting at Ernst August von Hannover’s scuffles without mentioning 
them explicitly); 3) Negation or reversal (for example, although this is never mentioned 
in the ECtHR judgement, the Lucky Strike campaigns represent a playful reversal of 
the ‘celebrity ad’ format, whereby the celebrity is not actually present in the ad). 
Metaphoric mechanisms, instead, are based on the decontextualization, merging 
or juxtaposition of elements coming from different conceptual domains, which are 
therefore at odds with each other: relevant examples include the combination of 
sexual imagery with prominent religious figures in Otto Mühl’s painting (Vereinigung 
Bildender Künstler), the use of a Sony slogan in a cartoon about 9/11 (Leroy), or the 
anachronisms involving Mary and Jesus in Sekmadienis Ltd.
As shown by this brief overview, Booth’s and Simpson’s models facilitate the 
systematic detection and discussion of humor indicators in a given text, thus allowing 
for a consistent handling of Question 1 above. Moving on to Question 2 (what is the 
aim or message hiding behind the humorous surface?), it becomes necessary to engage 
in what Booth designates as the ‘reconstruction’ of the text’s ultimate meaning. 
This stage is referred to by Simpson as the uptake phase, which follows the prime 
(taking the text at face value) and the dialectic phase (detecting the humor markers). 
In this final interpretive stage, the framing of the text in light of humor indicators 
is normally combined with contextual considerations; in Booth’s terminology, the 
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‘internal clues’ offered by the text tend to be read ‘in context’ in order to reconstruct 
the message (Booth, 1974: 76–86). But what does ‘context’ mean exactly? First of all, 
it may refer to the specific circumstances in which a text was originally published 
and circulated: for example, when discussing the aim and message of Otto Mühl’s 
painting, it is important to bear in mind that many of the figures portrayed in the 
painting were well-known exponents of a conservative right-wing party; likewise, the 
meaning of the Palomo Sánchez caricature is clarified by the circumstances under 
which it originated, namely in the midst of a trade-union dispute. But in addition to 
its primary meaning, the notion of context also encompasses the genre of a text, i.e. 
the general conventions and structuring principles guiding the understanding of a 
given specimen (e.g. the conventions of advertising in the cases of Ernst August von 
Hannover and Dieter Bohlen); as well as the intertexts that a given text is parodying or 
dialoguing with (such as the infamous advertising campaign echoed in the Kuliś and 
Różycki cartoon). Based on the insights coming from Booth and Simpson, as well as 
on contextual clues in the three senses that have just been presented, the discussion 
of the corpus texts can therefore be schematically reframed as shown in Table 1.
To be sure, the theory-grounded protocol presented in this section does not 
aim to become a method for objectively and infallibly determining the meaning 
of a given humorous text. Both the dialectic and the uptake phases are inevitably 
characterized by a degree of subjectivity; moreover, certain forms of humor can be 
extremely ‘unstable’, i.e. they make it particularly difficult to infer a stable meaning 
behind the humorous surface (Booth, 1974: 240). However, the categories derived 
from Booth and Simpson can mark a significant step towards a more consistent 
approach to humor in court, also with regard to Question 2 (reconstruction of aim 
and message).
The awareness of an inevitable margin of subjectivity lies at the basis of the third 
question listed at the beginning of this section: to what extent should alternative 
interpretations (by a reasonable or unreasonable audience) be accounted for? In 
order to tackle this question, judges need to move from the hermeneutic level 
(i.e. interpreting the text) to what Liesbeth Korthals Altes has defined as the meta-
hermeneutic level, that is the systematic investigation of the interpretive pathways 
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through which readers, viewers or listeners assign meanings and values to a text 
(Korthals Altes, 2014); in short, meta-hermeneutics is not interested in determining 
the single correct interpretation of a text, but rather in exploring the different 
interpretative options that are allowed for by the same text. But how can judges 
draw the boundaries of the author’s responsibility for the possible interpretations 
of an impugned text? As mentioned above, in Féret the court maintained that the 
author should be held accountable for how the material might be interpreted by 
unreasonable members of the majority, who might end up harming the targeted 
minority (‘such a discourse is inevitably bound to create in the public, especially 
among the lesser-equipped, sentiments of contempt, rejection, and hate towards 
foreigners’, Féret, §73). Others, instead, argue in favor of only assessing the author’s 
accountability from the perspective of a reasonable majority (as implied in the 
dissenting opinion to Féret) or from that of ‘a reasonable member of the target group’, 
i.e. of a vulnerable minority (Kuhn, 2019: 120). The dichotomy between majority and 
minority groups seems misleading and unnecessary, since judges should identify all 
potentially harmful interpretations of a given text—regardless of whether they are 
more likely to originate in any given sector of the audience. As for the hesitation 
between adopting the perspective of reasonable or unreasonable readers, this is 
exactly where interdisciplinary dialogue can be of particular help.
A valuable cue in this respect is provided once again by Wayne Booth, and more 
precisely by his notion of ‘implied reader’—namely the image of the recipient that 
the author presumably had in mind while writing, as it can be inferred based on 
textual and contextual indicators (Schmid, 2013 and Booth, 1983). This definition 
first originated in Booth’s work on narrative fiction at large, but can be particularly 
relevant in the analysis of humorous texts. In light of Booth’s definition, ‘implied 
reader’ can mean two different things: on the one hand, it designates the presumed 
addressee, i.e. the recipient ‘to whom the work is directed and whose linguistic codes, 
ideological norms, and aesthetic ideas must be taken into account if the work is to 
be understood’; on the other, it might refer to the ideal recipient, that is the person 
who ‘understands the work in a way that optimally matches its structure and adopts 
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the interpretive position and aesthetic standpoint put forward by the work’ (Schmid, 
2013). In short, the presumed addressee is the general public among which the 
author can rightfully expect her or his work to be circulated; the ideal recipient, 
instead, is the image of a reader who understands every nuance and agrees on every 
point with the author. The former category is obviously broader and more inclusive, 
and is therefore a safer guide when it comes to tackling the meta-hermeneutic issue 
of whose interpretations the author should be deemed accountable for. On such 
grounds, I argue that the question, to what extent should alternative interpretations 
(by a reasonable or unreasonable audience) be accounted for? should be reformulated 
as follows: to what extent can the text be interpreted in a harmful way by its presumed 
addressees? This latter formulation has the advantage of doing away with the shaky 
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable interpretations, as it focuses on 
the more feasible task of defining the presumed audience of the impugned work. 
For example, it is relatively easy to determine that (regardless of their final uptake) 
the presumed addressees of Otto Mühl’s painting must have been familiar with the 
political stances of the Austrian Freedom Party, or that those exposed to the Palomo 
Sánchez cartoon must have been able to connect it to an ongoing trade-union 
conflict; such considerations can prove instrumental in drawing a line between the 
possible (mis)interpretations that the author can be considered accountable for, and 
those that fall beyond the reach of the author’s responsibility.
6. Conclusion
The present study aimed to illustrate how legal scholars and professionals can 
benefit from a closer dialogue with humor studies; in order to do so, it provides the 
first systematic discussion of a corpus of humor-related cases from the European 
Court of Human Rights, with a special focus on cartoons and other comparable 
forms of predominantly visual humor. This paper has identified a set of 10 criteria 
used by ECtHR judges when dealing with humor or satire (Section 3), and discussed 
the specific challenges posed by humor to the implementation of such criteria 
(Section 4); most notably, the analysis of the corpus highlighted the lack of a shared 
vocabulary and of a consistent approach to the interpretation of humorous texts. 
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Section 5 showed how interdisciplinary dialogue can contribute to streamlining and 
rationalizing those interpretive issues: first of all, the identification and classification 
of humor indicators is facilitated by Booth’s discussion of overt and covert irony 
markers, as well as by Simpson’s typology of metonymic and metaphoric satirical 
devices; secondly, after the identification of humor markers, Booth’s and Simpson’s 
models can also contribute to defining a consistent protocol for the reconstruction 
of the text’s aim and message; thirdly, Booth’s notion of implied reader (especially 
in the sense of ‘presumed addressee’) can help judges in defining the spectrum of 
alternative interpretations that the author of the impugned text can be deemed 
responsible for.
Needless to say, the findings presented in this paper can be further developed 
in several directions, by way of extending the focus to other forms of verbal or non-
verbal humor, to other theoretical frameworks in addition to Booth and Simpson 
(e.g. Attardo and Raskin’s ‘General Theory of Verbal Humor’, as suggested in Little, 
2011: 104), and to other institutional contexts within and beyond Europe—thereby 
favoring comparative work and interdisciplinary collaboration with legal scholars 
focusing on different areas, such the United States (Little, 2019 and Todd, 2016) or 
Latin America (Capelotti, 2016). For the time being, it is hoped that this preliminary 
exploration makes a valid case in favor of forensic humor studies as a promising 
approach to some of the most urgent challenges related to the juridical regulation 
of freedom of expression.
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